Atheism and the Meaning of Life

A while back I got hammered for equivocating atheism with ontological naturalist even though 99.9% of atheists tacitly accept it. For the study of nature, methodological naturalism right limits its inquiries to matter [material cause] and efficient cause. Formal and final causes are not considered. Ontological naturalists make the metaphysical claim that only material and efficient causes exist. Physical objects and events are not ‘about’ anything. They just are. For the ontological naturalist the apparent intentional behavior of some things, from thermostats to human beings, is an illusion. That means that any concept that hinges on intentionality, like meaning and purpose, is also just a phantasy. Thus, the ontological naturalist that says their life can have meaning is contradicting himself or herself.

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(5th February 2015, 20:58)rasetsu Wrote:To say that something is an illusion isn't necessarily to say that it's phantasy. All it means is that there is a description of the phenomena that is closer to reality than the surface description normally attributed to a thing. If meaning and intentionality are illusions, it simply means there's a better description of them than the one we have. It doesn't imply that the phenomena are empty.

I think you are referring to an epistemological difference of degree (like Newtonian vs. Quantum physics) whereas I am pointing to an ontological difference of kind. 
I think an illusion occurs when something only appears to be one thing when it is actually another. For example, the thing in the dark corner may appear to be a snake when it is actually a coil of rope. Mistaking a coil of rope for a snake is an error of kind, not of degree. 

As it applies to the issue of intentionality, something either has it or it doesn’t. The needle of a thermostat only appears intent on reaching the set point, whereas a cheetah actuallyintends to nab zebras. I say the goal directed behavior of the thermostat is an illusion while the goal directed behavior of the cheetah is real – a difference of kind.

Likewise, as it applies to meaning, the idea that meaning can be found in a purely physical description of something is ludicrous. While the physical beads can represent the non-physical ideas of enumeration, no purely physical description of an abacus would ever reveal the significance of the beads. Again, we see a difference in kind between a sign and its significance.


More atheist idiocy...

(6th February 2015, 03:23)Esquilax Wrote:

(5th February 2015, 23:39)ChadWooters Wrote:As it applies to the issue of intentionality, something either has it or it doesn’t. The needle of a thermostat only appears intent on reaching the set point, whereas a cheetah actually intends to nab zebras. I say the goal directed behavior of the thermostat is an illusion while the goal directed behavior of the cheetah is real – a difference of kind.

Can I ask why you constantly assume that there's a dichotomy here?

When alternatives result in paradoxes and unsolvable dilemmas that means the proposed solutions are inadequate, incomplete, or down right false. The first alternative is that neither the thermostat nor the cheetah engage in goal-seeking behavior. The second alternative is that both the thermostat and the cheetah engage in goal-seeking behavior. 
The first alternative posits that the cheetah is without intention. Anyone, but the most strident eliminative materialist, can see that that is false.
The second is false because it attributes mental properties to the thermostat. A panpsychist would argue that this may not be entirely false. And I am open to considering this a real possibility, but the current state of that theory is very inadequate. 
The solution to the problem lies in recognizing the difference between essential and accidental properties. The goal-seeking behavior of the cheetah is an essential part of being a cheetah because the final end of any living thing is to live and thrive. It could not do if intentional behavior were removed. In contrast to this, the function of any artifact, like a thermostat is an accidental property of its composition. Any apparent goal-seeking behavior by the thermostat is derived from a person that has an intended goal in actuality.

(6th February 2015, 03:23)Esquilax Wrote:Likewise, as it applies to meaning, the idea that meaning can be found in a purely physical description of something is ludicrous.

Why do you think this? … what observations led you to this conclusion? [/quote]Really? LOL! It should be obvious. What is the meaning of a rock? Or a waterfall? Or a caterpillar? 

(6th February 2015, 03:23)Esquilax Wrote:So how did you come to the conclusion that significance can only be imbued from outside? …What's the actual quality that allows meaning to come into being?

The meaning of things come from recognition of the ideas they instantiate or some correspondence with those ideas. To understand this, you must know a little something about the problem of universals, as conceived by Plato, refined by Aristotle, and perfected by the Schoolmen. Plato observed that part of what allows us to identify universals from particulars is that the particulars, to greater and lesser degrees, all manifest the same form. But Plato imagined these as forms as distinct entities, which was problematic for several reasons, primarily because forms multiply without restraint. Aristotle observed that forms, while real, don’t float around in some separate realm, but are always embodied. While this was an improvement, comparison between particulars to determine a common form is only really possible by referring to an infinite series of super-universals above the universals. The Scholastic solution accepts that forms are embodied but that the intellect perceives the idea of the form by means of abstraction. However the idea of a form must exist in potential before it can be actually manifest in the intellect. In order for something to move from potential to actuality it must do so by means of something already in act. Thus the idea must exist in full actuality. And since God is the only being that is fully in act, the perfect form of any idea must already be in His intellect.

Quote:While the physical beads can represent the non-physical ideas of enumeration, no purely physical description of an abacus would ever reveal the significance of the beads. Again, we see a difference in kind between a sign and its significance.

(6th February 2015, 03:23)Esquilax Wrote:Because human beings are capable of imbuing meaning and purpose in other objects … is there any reason they can't apply meaning and purpose to themselves?

Duh! I said as much earlier. What is at issue is why we have that capacity. Having that capacity is inconsistent with ontological naturalism. 

(6th February 2015, 03:23)Esquilax Wrote:That's not exactly an impressive quality, and if god doesn't have a pre-existing entity to bring him into existence, doesn't that mean god is meaningless and purposeless, just as you accuse others of being?

Not at all. God is fully in act, as mentioned above.