Alex Rosenberg on Beliefs

Alex Rosenberg is an atheist and philosopher of science who maintains that if naturalism is true, then beliefs cannot exist. (How he can believe this is a mystery to me.) He is also the author of "The Atheist's Guide to Reality."Anyway, here is his argument:

1: If naturalism is true, then beliefs are brain states.
2: Brain states are physical configurations of matter.
3: Therefore, if naturalism is true, beliefs are physical configurations of matter.
4: In order to qualify as beliefs proper, they need to have the property of intentionality (i.e. to refer to or be "about" something)
5: Physical configurations of matter cannot, in virtue just of its physical structure, composition, location, or causal relation, be “about” another configuration of matter in the way original intentionality requires.
6: Therefore, if naturalism is true, beliefs cannot be "about" anything.
7: Therefore, if naturalism is true, there are not beliefs.
8: Naturalism is true.
9: Therefore, there are not beliefs.

and 

10: If there are not beliefs, then there are not true or false beliefs either.

More on the subject:

Physical things have no meaning in themselves. As a physical object a painting is an ordered collection of pigment and oil on rough cloth. It isn't about anything. But as an object of contemplation at a painting is about something. It has a subject matter to which it refers. The properties of physical things do not point to anything beyond themselves. This is in stark contrast to mental properties. Beliefs, fears, and thoughts are all about something. You can believe the earth is round. You can fear spiders. You can remember the Mount Rushmore. These mental properties are about the earth, spiders and Mount Rushmore. But the earth, spiders, and Mount Rushmore as physical things are not about anything.

The cornerstone of naturalism is physical reduction. Yet intentionality cannot fit into naturalism. Alex Rosenberg is fully aware of this. And yet he does not let this shake his conviction that everything is physical. Instead his intellectual commitment to atheistic naturalism forces him to admit the inherent nihilism of that position.

My thesis was based on semiotics and the relationship between signs and the signified. It occurred to me that since signs, as physical artifacts, had no inherent meaning that other physical properties such has brain-states also had no inherent meaning. From a purely objective point of view meaning must be assigned to physical systems from the outside via intellection. I have not made up my mind as to whether meant the absence of an epistomic link or an ontological one. Either way mental properties cannot be reduced to physical ones.

I came across Jime's blog some time ago and learned about Alex Rosenberg's argument. It seemed to present the thesis in a much more succinct way. I also found it interesting that a self-avowed atheist would present the same idea, so I posted it to see what others thought.

And even More:

(21st April 2013, 15:34)whateverist Wrote:...Brains states which underpin beliefs aside from being configurations of matter are already about something. Similarly if I write out a "Spare any change?" sign on a scrap of paper, the piece of paper is just a piece of inert material, compositionally. But now it also conveys my belief that someone is going to throw me some coin, which is my intention.

In your example, the paper does not in itself have meaning. It must be interpreted and assigned meaning from the outside. If your note is written in English it will have no meaning to someone who only knows Chinese. Likewise a brain-state, as a physical thing, has no meaning unless one is assigned to it. When you say conveys your intention, what then is the ontological status of your intention. Is the intention a thing in and of itself, conveyed first by your brain then transferred to paper? This implies something independent of both your brain and the paper that has been transferred. What is that thing?