Just to be clear, my definition of nihilism is very broad: holding that all values are baseless and that nothing can be known or communicated.
This takes me to my third component needed to counter nihilism: significance.
Significance refers to the relationship between a signs, or signifiers, and that to which the signs refer (the signified). So when people say that life has significance, then they are essentially claiming that their being and actions are signifiers that point to something external to them.
Signs are physical and include material forms, like letters, images, and artifacts; structured events, like music and speech; or some combination of both. The meanings of the signs are what people assign to otherwise meaningless things. For example, in traffic a blinking red light means ‘stop’ only as a matter of convention. Physical things in and of themselves do not have meaning without an interpreter.
Every atheist I know assumes that the brain adequately serves as the interpreter of signs. There is a problem with this assumption. Brains are themselves sensible objects performing material processes and like all other physical things have no meaning.
Neural correlates are like abacus beads that require the interpretation of a knowing subject. The brain cannot act as the interpreter of its own physical states because that makes an empty self-referential circle. Nor can one part of the brain serve and the interpreter of another, since the first would itself require interpretation from a second, the second by a third and so on, i.e. an infinite regress. Nor can the brain, as a whole, can be broken down into smaller and smaller interpreters, each assigning meaning to lesser and lesser signs. Even the smallest sign requires an interpreter no matter how tiny. You cannot build something out of nothing.
The above is how a God or gods provide a basis for value that atheism lacks: value is contingent on [a] non-physical interpreter[s].
Thursday, July 6, 2017
More about Atheistic Nihilism,...and the Abacus
Technically, you can disbelieve in god/gods without considering yourself a nihilist. In practice most atheists have, either explicitly or tacitly, philosophies of physical monism and ontological naturalism. Here I am thinking of meaning in semiotic terms and not as a synonym for purpose.
In order for something to have meaning it must refer to something else. It must call to mind something else. So for example, the beads of an abacus or lights on a scoreboard have no meaning until interpreted as a reference to quantities by a knowing subject. Likewise, a depictive painting is nothing more than smears of oil and dirt on a flat surface until the arrangement of colors calls to mind an image of something other than the painting itself.
The foregoing atheistic philosophies assert that human experience reduces to a physical reaction. And physical things and processes have no meaning except those assigned to them by a knowing subject. This raises two questions. First, does the materialistic understanding of human nature satisfy the requirements of a ‘knowing subject’? Second, given a knowing subject, to what can the physical process of an individual’s live refer other than itself? I will leave aside the firs question and focus on the second.
To me “knowing” applies to more than processes like complex data processing or reacting to sensible patterns. Such functions, as functions, can be adequately understood in terms of physical processes. Knowledge includes seeing things beyond what is immediately apparent, i.e. understanding what they signify. In the context of this discussion, the assignment of meaning happens when a particular instance represents a fuller, broader, and more general principle. In physical terms an architect can look at a crack and see it as a particular manifestation of thermal expansion and contraction. Not all references are physical. To what broader quantifiable physical process or state does the word “liberty” point?
Some will say that these are just abstractions derived from experience of physical reality and have no reality apart from the mind. That is partly true. Everything we know, does indeed, ultimately come from our experience with sensible objects. That does not automatically entail that transcendent principles, like liberty, are not real. A physicalist generally has no problem with calling a particular action, like a falling apple, representative of something more universal and equally real, like gravity. What prevents you from gaining knowledge of transcendent principles within physical processes and things by means of observation? When people move freely across borders, this is a sign of their liberty. On what basis do you say that gravity is real, but liberty is not? True, gravity can be quantified in a way that liberty cannot. At the same time, I think it is a mistake to not include qualitative features in your assessment of what is and is not real.
Which leads me to why I think atheism is ultimately nihilist. When you say your life has meaning, you are assigning qualitative significance to what you consider a physical process. However that kind of qualitative assignment is precluded by the physical monism and ontological naturalism.
In order for something to have meaning it must refer to something else. It must call to mind something else. So for example, the beads of an abacus or lights on a scoreboard have no meaning until interpreted as a reference to quantities by a knowing subject. Likewise, a depictive painting is nothing more than smears of oil and dirt on a flat surface until the arrangement of colors calls to mind an image of something other than the painting itself.
The foregoing atheistic philosophies assert that human experience reduces to a physical reaction. And physical things and processes have no meaning except those assigned to them by a knowing subject. This raises two questions. First, does the materialistic understanding of human nature satisfy the requirements of a ‘knowing subject’? Second, given a knowing subject, to what can the physical process of an individual’s live refer other than itself? I will leave aside the firs question and focus on the second.
To me “knowing” applies to more than processes like complex data processing or reacting to sensible patterns. Such functions, as functions, can be adequately understood in terms of physical processes. Knowledge includes seeing things beyond what is immediately apparent, i.e. understanding what they signify. In the context of this discussion, the assignment of meaning happens when a particular instance represents a fuller, broader, and more general principle. In physical terms an architect can look at a crack and see it as a particular manifestation of thermal expansion and contraction. Not all references are physical. To what broader quantifiable physical process or state does the word “liberty” point?
Some will say that these are just abstractions derived from experience of physical reality and have no reality apart from the mind. That is partly true. Everything we know, does indeed, ultimately come from our experience with sensible objects. That does not automatically entail that transcendent principles, like liberty, are not real. A physicalist generally has no problem with calling a particular action, like a falling apple, representative of something more universal and equally real, like gravity. What prevents you from gaining knowledge of transcendent principles within physical processes and things by means of observation? When people move freely across borders, this is a sign of their liberty. On what basis do you say that gravity is real, but liberty is not? True, gravity can be quantified in a way that liberty cannot. At the same time, I think it is a mistake to not include qualitative features in your assessment of what is and is not real.
Which leads me to why I think atheism is ultimately nihilist. When you say your life has meaning, you are assigning qualitative significance to what you consider a physical process. However that kind of qualitative assignment is precluded by the physical monism and ontological naturalism.
Intentionality in the Causal Chain
Teleological concepts, are just that - concepts. And they are concepts assigned by one deterministic chain reaction on to another. Second, a causal chain has no definable start or end point. This means that you must arbitrary select one cause as the point where intention occurs and arbitrary select one effect as its desired end. For example, take the following causal chain:
A ---> B ---> C---> D ---> E- ---> F
Which effect is the desired end of cause A? If you say it is F, why isn't it D? And why isn't F the desired end of C and not A? Only an oustide observer can designate the start and its desired end. And you cannot say that one causal chain, like a human electro-chemical reaction, applies it to the electro-chemical process of the bacteria. Why? Because now you are saying that one meaningless physical process is transferring meaning it doesn't have onto another.
A ---> B ---> C---> D ---> E- ---> F
Which effect is the desired end of cause A? If you say it is F, why isn't it D? And why isn't F the desired end of C and not A? Only an oustide observer can designate the start and its desired end. And you cannot say that one causal chain, like a human electro-chemical reaction, applies it to the electro-chemical process of the bacteria. Why? Because now you are saying that one meaningless physical process is transferring meaning it doesn't have onto another.
(5th May 2013, 00:16)Lord Privy Seal Wrote:No, I am attributing teleology to the whole-system of the bacterium, which is greater than the sum of its chemical parts.Keyword: attributing. Once you start to talk about emergent properties, you've already given up the game. You cease talking about physical properties and begin discussing mental ones. This is a problem because you can now start assigning mental properties to anything you want. "My thermostat wants to reach 72 degrees."
(5th May 2013, 00:16)Lord Privy Seal Wrote:You seem to be very hung up on things like chemistry and extreme reductionism.Guilty as charged. Physical reductionism is a pernicious and common belief among AF members. I doubt that many fully understand the logical conclusions of this belief.
(5th May 2013, 00:16)Lord Privy Seal Wrote:OK, instead of a bacterium, let's talk about the ghostNow you have posited the existence of a non-physical entity already endowed with mental properties like intention. That's hardly comparable with an actual physical process.
of a bacterium, it's beautiful sparkly little soul. Now that there's no nasty chemistry involved, how does this change anything? How are we now suddenly able to talk about purpose and intention and "about-ability"
(5th May 2013, 00:16)Lord Privy Seal Wrote:In a Universe with such an entity, everything is necessarily deterministic (or predestined, if you prefer that term).That is only one doctrine. I have a different view.
(5th May 2013, 00:16)Lord Privy Seal Wrote:You're mis-applying reductionism. A tire can't drive anybody anywhere. Therefore, there can't be such things as cars, unless "driving" is defined as a supernatural act.Not at all. I try to maintain a clear distinction between identifiable physical processes and descriptions made in terms of mental properties. I think far too many people blurr that distinction with ambiguois ideas like emergence as if that somehow bridges the Cartesian divide.
(5th May 2013, 00:16)Lord Privy Seal Wrote:As far as I can tell, teleological operations are substrate-invariant. If a particular calculation is performed using the beads of an abacus, the gears and cams of a Babbage machine...Kudos for mentioning Babbage machines. You prove my point. The beads of an abacus have no meaning in and of themselves. An intelligent agent must assign the meaning of '1' to some beads and the value of '5' to others. Not to mention the order of magnitude represented by each column. The abacus itself has no meaning.
The Abacus and Semiotics
(16th May 2014, 15:30)Pickup_shonuff Wrote:
(16th May 2014, 14:21)ChadWooters Wrote:If by vindicate you mean that spiritual experiences have physical affects, I don't see that as justification for assuming that spiritual events are entirely physical.And I was careful to say spiritual experience recognizing that different religious traditions interpret these experiences in various ways. That does not invalidate the basic experience.
The problem is, I think, that unless the distinction is more clearly defined and demonstrated, we're merely arguing semantics, describing the phenomena of experience in a manner--on the one hand--that tries to appreciate the notion of objective facts, and on the other, that seeks to reduce them to merely esoteric symbols, symbols that offer no predictive value or shed light on uncharted territory of human experience. What justification do we have for extending spiritual experiences beyond the physical when the only widely accepted definition of a supernatural occurrence is that which eludes critical examination?
Substitute the word mental for spiritual, and it leads back to the original post. And yes it is a matter of semantics in the truest sense of the word. The question is about how significance can supervene on physical processes. The meaning of signs and symbols have absolutely no objective relationship with the form or medium of the signs themselves. Abacus beads have no inherent meaning until a knowing subject assigns them meanings. Nor do arrangements of LED lights on a screen. And when I say the same about the fully physical states of the brain it is completely consistent with the relationship between signs and significance with all other physical systems. Materialist make an exception for brains without any evidence for a mechanism that defines the difference between conscious and unconscious processes. That's what they call special pleading.
(29th August 2013, 00:39)BrianSoddingBoru4 Wrote:...get a verifiable positive reading and I'll shake your hand and retract my prior statement. Until and unless that happens, I'm going to go on happy in my conviction that consciousness is the result of brain function.Nevertheless your conviction would not be based on science. In your opinion, brain events generate mental properties. An alternate opinion, one with which I agree, holds that brain states represent mental properties similar to how abacus beads stand for numbers.It would be like erasing a PDF after you read it. The signs that represent meaning would be gone, but the meaning would remain in thought.
In either case, when brain activity ceases, the body would no longer be able to express mental properties. Neither theory is falsifiable nor does either one of them qualify as a proper scientific theory. Thus resolution of the mind-body problem is beyond the reach of neuroscience.
(20th October 2013, 10:32)genkaus Wrote:Aren't you missing the fact that "seeing beyond what is immediately apparent" is a form of complex data processing.
You have confused data processing with the assignment of meaning. The first is the manipulation of symbols. The second is interpreting the significance of those symbols. A machine process can start with one set of symbols and follow rules to produce a second. It can do so without any understanding of what the symbols mean. Understanding the significance of the symbols is another thing altogether. The thought problem that illustrates your mistake is Searle’s “Chinese Room”.
Alex Rosenberg on Beliefs
Alex Rosenberg is an atheist and philosopher of science who maintains that if naturalism is true, then beliefs cannot exist. (How he can believe this is a mystery to me.) He is also the author of "The Atheist's Guide to Reality."Anyway, here is his argument:
1: If naturalism is true, then beliefs are brain states.
2: Brain states are physical configurations of matter.
3: Therefore, if naturalism is true, beliefs are physical configurations of matter.
4: In order to qualify as beliefs proper, they need to have the property of intentionality (i.e. to refer to or be "about" something)
5: Physical configurations of matter cannot, in virtue just of its physical structure, composition, location, or causal relation, be “about” another configuration of matter in the way original intentionality requires.
6: Therefore, if naturalism is true, beliefs cannot be "about" anything.
7: Therefore, if naturalism is true, there are not beliefs.
8: Naturalism is true.
9: Therefore, there are not beliefs.
and
10: If there are not beliefs, then there are not true or false beliefs either.
More on the subject:
Physical things have no meaning in themselves. As a physical object a painting is an ordered collection of pigment and oil on rough cloth. It isn't about anything. But as an object of contemplation at a painting is about something. It has a subject matter to which it refers. The properties of physical things do not point to anything beyond themselves. This is in stark contrast to mental properties. Beliefs, fears, and thoughts are all about something. You can believe the earth is round. You can fear spiders. You can remember the Mount Rushmore. These mental properties are about the earth, spiders and Mount Rushmore. But the earth, spiders, and Mount Rushmore as physical things are not about anything.
The cornerstone of naturalism is physical reduction. Yet intentionality cannot fit into naturalism. Alex Rosenberg is fully aware of this. And yet he does not let this shake his conviction that everything is physical. Instead his intellectual commitment to atheistic naturalism forces him to admit the inherent nihilism of that position.
My thesis was based on semiotics and the relationship between signs and the signified. It occurred to me that since signs, as physical artifacts, had no inherent meaning that other physical properties such has brain-states also had no inherent meaning. From a purely objective point of view meaning must be assigned to physical systems from the outside via intellection. I have not made up my mind as to whether meant the absence of an epistomic link or an ontological one. Either way mental properties cannot be reduced to physical ones.
I came across Jime's blog some time ago and learned about Alex Rosenberg's argument. It seemed to present the thesis in a much more succinct way. I also found it interesting that a self-avowed atheist would present the same idea, so I posted it to see what others thought.
And even More:
(21st April 2013, 15:34)whateverist Wrote:...Brains states which underpin beliefs aside from being configurations of matter are already about something. Similarly if I write out a "Spare any change?" sign on a scrap of paper, the piece of paper is just a piece of inert material, compositionally. But now it also conveys my belief that someone is going to throw me some coin, which is my intention.In your example, the paper does not in itself have meaning. It must be interpreted and assigned meaning from the outside. If your note is written in English it will have no meaning to someone who only knows Chinese. Likewise a brain-state, as a physical thing, has no meaning unless one is assigned to it. When you say conveys your intention, what then is the ontological status of your intention. Is the intention a thing in and of itself, conveyed first by your brain then transferred to paper? This implies something independent of both your brain and the paper that has been transferred. What is that thing?
Harmonization, I don't know.
I while back I made my own attempt at harmonization of the resurrection accounts:
Each of the Gospel accounts report events from the perscpective of the four writers. Where one writer glosses over certain happenings, the other writers supply the details. The four Gospel accounts compliment each other, and taken together, give us a more comprehensive picture of what happened. No Gospel account directly contradicts any of the others. I made a side-by-side comparision of all four and assembled for you the followings narrative.
The guards watch dumbfounded as an angel uses an earthquake to roll away the stone that had sealed the tomb. The guards flee in terror. Mary Magdelalene, Mary mother of James, Joanna, and other unnamed women go to visit the grave.
Matt 28:2-4 is the only Gospel account to supply details about the guards and the earthquake.
John 20:1 focuses on Mary Magdelalene to the exclusion of the other woment in the party.
Matt 28:1 also focuses on Mary Magdelaene, incidentally mentions Mary mother of James, but not the other women.
Luke 24:10 identifies Joanna as one of the women in the party.
When they arrive they see that the tomb has been opened and they see a youth sitting on the stone. The child tells them that Jesus isn't there because he had risen and that they should tell the disciples. The youth also tells them that Jesus will meet them in Galelie.Some or all of the women then enter the tomb. Two men suddenly appear. The men say, "He is not here...". The women bow to the ground in reverence. Then they go back to some the disciples reporting what the youth and the two men had said. Mary Magdalene appears to remember what was said but still believes someone carted away the body.
None of the disciples present believe the women. Mary Magdalene leads Peter and John back to the tomb so they could see for themselves..John rushes ahead but doesn't enter. He watches from the outside as Peter goes into the tomb and examines the burial wrappings. While John and Peter are examining the tomb, the two men appear to Mary again. This time Jesus is with them although she doesn't recognize him until he says her name.
Matt 28:7 records what the youth said then skips all the intervining details and goes direct to the appearence in the upper room.
Mark 16:7 also records the encounter with the youth, but omits the details of the two men. Mark also skips over Peter, John's and Mary's visit.
Luke 24:12 focuses on Peter as the central character to the exclusion of John and Mary.
John 20:8-18 adds all the details relating John and Mary Magdalene.
Meanwhile, two of the disciples, one named Cleopas, are walking to Emmas, They meet a man on the road and have dinner with him and discuss the events of the Passion. Suddenly the two disciples finally recognize the man as the risen Christ.
Mark 16 and John 20 do not record this particualar visitation.
Finally, everyone is united for dinner. Peter and John report to the rest that the tomb was empty. The two disciples returning from Emmau chime in and report their encounter with Jesus. And the reports of Mary Magdalene and the other women are fresh in their minds. Everyone is confused. The remaining disciples, including Thomas, don't believe any of it until finally Jesus appears within their midst to clear up the events of the day.
And that is how it happened...
Those who say that the four Gospel accounts conflict have not taken the time to complete the puzzle. I have done so for you, so that you may understand the story in its entirety.
Each of the Gospel accounts report events from the perscpective of the four writers. Where one writer glosses over certain happenings, the other writers supply the details. The four Gospel accounts compliment each other, and taken together, give us a more comprehensive picture of what happened. No Gospel account directly contradicts any of the others. I made a side-by-side comparision of all four and assembled for you the followings narrative.
The guards watch dumbfounded as an angel uses an earthquake to roll away the stone that had sealed the tomb. The guards flee in terror. Mary Magdelalene, Mary mother of James, Joanna, and other unnamed women go to visit the grave.
Matt 28:2-4 is the only Gospel account to supply details about the guards and the earthquake.
John 20:1 focuses on Mary Magdelalene to the exclusion of the other woment in the party.
Matt 28:1 also focuses on Mary Magdelaene, incidentally mentions Mary mother of James, but not the other women.
Luke 24:10 identifies Joanna as one of the women in the party.
When they arrive they see that the tomb has been opened and they see a youth sitting on the stone. The child tells them that Jesus isn't there because he had risen and that they should tell the disciples. The youth also tells them that Jesus will meet them in Galelie.Some or all of the women then enter the tomb. Two men suddenly appear. The men say, "He is not here...". The women bow to the ground in reverence. Then they go back to some the disciples reporting what the youth and the two men had said. Mary Magdalene appears to remember what was said but still believes someone carted away the body.
None of the disciples present believe the women. Mary Magdalene leads Peter and John back to the tomb so they could see for themselves..John rushes ahead but doesn't enter. He watches from the outside as Peter goes into the tomb and examines the burial wrappings. While John and Peter are examining the tomb, the two men appear to Mary again. This time Jesus is with them although she doesn't recognize him until he says her name.
Matt 28:7 records what the youth said then skips all the intervining details and goes direct to the appearence in the upper room.
Mark 16:7 also records the encounter with the youth, but omits the details of the two men. Mark also skips over Peter, John's and Mary's visit.
Luke 24:12 focuses on Peter as the central character to the exclusion of John and Mary.
John 20:8-18 adds all the details relating John and Mary Magdalene.
Meanwhile, two of the disciples, one named Cleopas, are walking to Emmas, They meet a man on the road and have dinner with him and discuss the events of the Passion. Suddenly the two disciples finally recognize the man as the risen Christ.
Mark 16 and John 20 do not record this particualar visitation.
Finally, everyone is united for dinner. Peter and John report to the rest that the tomb was empty. The two disciples returning from Emmau chime in and report their encounter with Jesus. And the reports of Mary Magdalene and the other women are fresh in their minds. Everyone is confused. The remaining disciples, including Thomas, don't believe any of it until finally Jesus appears within their midst to clear up the events of the day.
And that is how it happened...
Those who say that the four Gospel accounts conflict have not taken the time to complete the puzzle. I have done so for you, so that you may understand the story in its entirety.
I cannot say that I agree entirely with this post any more. But I'm keeping it as a relic of my previous philosophical musings:
The “Problem of Evil” as traditionally presented:
Question: Can an all-powerful and all-good God create an all-good world?
An all-good God would try to create an all-good world.
An all-powerful God would be able to make an all-good world.
The world is all-good.
Orthodox monotheism, as commonly understood, argues that all three statements are true. Like others on AF, I find traditional appeals to free-will and the ‘best of all possible worlds’ defenses less than compelling. The inability of orthodoxy to adequately defend against the problem of evil follows from its misunderstanding of the nature of God.
In this thread I will present a preliminary attempt to acknowledge the apparent evil present in the world within a theistic framework. I believe this framework more closely reflects God as presented in the bible without the speculations of the Scholastics. I will do so from the perspective of a Panenthestic, neo-Platonic interpretation of Emanuel Swedenborg’s theology, widely considered a heretical position by the larger Christian community. I have capitalized terms associated with absolutes, ultimates and universals to distinguish them from approximates or appearances of the same.
Unlike Pantheism, which means ‘the natural world is God’, Panentheism means ‘the natural world is within god’. Panentheism considers God to be all of reality, or the All. The All includes a natural aspect, but also includes other aspects inferred from the natural. In Panentheism (or at least the kind I advocate) creation simply means the process of substance taking a particular form. This conforms to Swedenborg’s assertion that God created the natural world ‘out of Himself’, as opposed to ‘out of nothing’. (Out of nothing, nothing comes.)
God is defined as the Supreme Being, or the All, understood as the unity of Ideal Form (ultimate Truth) and Primal Matter (universal good).
Reality is that which is considered self-evident and primary. Objective reality exists independent of human perception. Anything capable of apprehension by the senses of anyone falls with objective reality. Subjective reality is anything apprehensible only by the experience of a specific sentient being. Every real thing has two aspects: formal and substantial. Formal is synonymous with the conceptual, abstract and ‘spiritual’. Substantial is synonymous with physical and material. While form and substance can be thought of as distinct aspects of reality, one cannot exist independent of the other. Every substance has a form and every form has a substance.
The Good is identified with Primal Matter and its essence is Love. The Good subsists in-itself and, as Love, strives for completeness and coherence. Evil is a local lack of these qualities, i.e. imperfection and corruption. The Good is the highest of all goods from which all lesser goods are derived. The goals of goods are called goodwill. The actions of goods are called good deeds. The results of goods are called virtues.
The True is identified with Ideal Form and its essence is Wisdom. The True is the manifestation of the Good’s completeness and coherence. Things that appear true can be found within and conform to the Ideal Form. What we identify as true are those things that, in our estimation and judgment, accurately embody forms taken from the True.
Where orthodoxy sees Omniscience, I see subjective experience active at all scales of reality. As an advocate of pan-psychism, I consider proto-consciousness (‘knowing’ at the smallest scale) as a universal aspect of reality. Self-awareness becomes apparent when substance reaches the level of complexity needed to bind proto-conscious monads into higher forms that more closely approximate the Ideal Form. The soul of a sentient being is the unity of that beings highest formal attributes with the smallest necessary substantial basis. Since the All is the largest scale manifesting the highest degree of complexity, the totality has within it all consciousness. God with respect to His understanding is the ‘knowing that is within all’.
Where orthodoxy sees Omnipotence, I see the universal self-organizing power (potency) within the Good to subsist and support the subsistence of lesser goods. The All strives to create wholes that reflect its own coherence and completeness. Because the All is complete and coherent, no lack can be found within it. Thus evil cannot be ascribed to the All. Since only the All can be a perfect unity, i.e. the One, all creations within the all can only partially embody the Good of the All. Thus all creations, as partial goods, express some lack of good. These lacks are called evils. Because evils are the absence of the good that would make something a perfect unity, evils are really nothing at all, just fantasies without substance or form.
Thus evil is not a universal state that we can ascribe to the All, but rather we find evils within local conditions. This is what the statement by Heraclitus that “For God everything is good, but for mortals there is good and evil” means to me.
And some clarifications:
I am no longer a pan-phycism advocate.
The “Problem of Evil” as traditionally presented:
Question: Can an all-powerful and all-good God create an all-good world?
An all-good God would try to create an all-good world.
An all-powerful God would be able to make an all-good world.
The world is all-good.
Orthodox monotheism, as commonly understood, argues that all three statements are true. Like others on AF, I find traditional appeals to free-will and the ‘best of all possible worlds’ defenses less than compelling. The inability of orthodoxy to adequately defend against the problem of evil follows from its misunderstanding of the nature of God.
In this thread I will present a preliminary attempt to acknowledge the apparent evil present in the world within a theistic framework. I believe this framework more closely reflects God as presented in the bible without the speculations of the Scholastics. I will do so from the perspective of a Panenthestic, neo-Platonic interpretation of Emanuel Swedenborg’s theology, widely considered a heretical position by the larger Christian community. I have capitalized terms associated with absolutes, ultimates and universals to distinguish them from approximates or appearances of the same.
Unlike Pantheism, which means ‘the natural world is God’, Panentheism means ‘the natural world is within god’. Panentheism considers God to be all of reality, or the All. The All includes a natural aspect, but also includes other aspects inferred from the natural. In Panentheism (or at least the kind I advocate) creation simply means the process of substance taking a particular form. This conforms to Swedenborg’s assertion that God created the natural world ‘out of Himself’, as opposed to ‘out of nothing’. (Out of nothing, nothing comes.)
God is defined as the Supreme Being, or the All, understood as the unity of Ideal Form (ultimate Truth) and Primal Matter (universal good).
Reality is that which is considered self-evident and primary. Objective reality exists independent of human perception. Anything capable of apprehension by the senses of anyone falls with objective reality. Subjective reality is anything apprehensible only by the experience of a specific sentient being. Every real thing has two aspects: formal and substantial. Formal is synonymous with the conceptual, abstract and ‘spiritual’. Substantial is synonymous with physical and material. While form and substance can be thought of as distinct aspects of reality, one cannot exist independent of the other. Every substance has a form and every form has a substance.
The Good is identified with Primal Matter and its essence is Love. The Good subsists in-itself and, as Love, strives for completeness and coherence. Evil is a local lack of these qualities, i.e. imperfection and corruption. The Good is the highest of all goods from which all lesser goods are derived. The goals of goods are called goodwill. The actions of goods are called good deeds. The results of goods are called virtues.
The True is identified with Ideal Form and its essence is Wisdom. The True is the manifestation of the Good’s completeness and coherence. Things that appear true can be found within and conform to the Ideal Form. What we identify as true are those things that, in our estimation and judgment, accurately embody forms taken from the True.
Where orthodoxy sees Omniscience, I see subjective experience active at all scales of reality. As an advocate of pan-psychism, I consider proto-consciousness (‘knowing’ at the smallest scale) as a universal aspect of reality. Self-awareness becomes apparent when substance reaches the level of complexity needed to bind proto-conscious monads into higher forms that more closely approximate the Ideal Form. The soul of a sentient being is the unity of that beings highest formal attributes with the smallest necessary substantial basis. Since the All is the largest scale manifesting the highest degree of complexity, the totality has within it all consciousness. God with respect to His understanding is the ‘knowing that is within all’.
Where orthodoxy sees Omnipotence, I see the universal self-organizing power (potency) within the Good to subsist and support the subsistence of lesser goods. The All strives to create wholes that reflect its own coherence and completeness. Because the All is complete and coherent, no lack can be found within it. Thus evil cannot be ascribed to the All. Since only the All can be a perfect unity, i.e. the One, all creations within the all can only partially embody the Good of the All. Thus all creations, as partial goods, express some lack of good. These lacks are called evils. Because evils are the absence of the good that would make something a perfect unity, evils are really nothing at all, just fantasies without substance or form.
Thus evil is not a universal state that we can ascribe to the All, but rather we find evils within local conditions. This is what the statement by Heraclitus that “For God everything is good, but for mortals there is good and evil” means to me.
And some clarifications:
I am no longer a pan-phycism advocate.
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